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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Voorhis dissenting, held that the man was not fired because of any inference
that he was a member of the Communist Party, nor because he invoked the
Fifth Amendment, but because of the doubt created in the mind of his employer
as to his reliability. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision."
In the present case, duty required the attorney to answer: privilege per-
mitted him to decline to answer. The exercising of the privilege, however, was
entirely inconsistent with his duty as a member of the bar, and the violation
of his duty constituted cause for disbarment. 6
E IGHT LIGHTs Dnxrmo STATUTE HELD NOT VAGUE
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 375(3) states:
"... whenever a vehicle approaching from ahead is within five hun-
dred feet ... the headlamps, if of the multiple beam type, shall be
operated so that dazzling light does not interfere with the driver of
the approaching vehicle. .2
In People v. Meola"7 the constitutionality of this section was put in ques-
tion. Defendant was convicted in the Court of Special Sessions of the Town
of Newburg for failing to dim her headlights.
On alpeal defendant made two contentions. First, that the statute in
question is constitutionally vague insofar as the phrase "dazzling light" is in-
capable of any objective measurement, and is thereby meaningless as to
furnishing the citizen a standard of required conduct. Secondly, the term
"interferes" is indefinite and makes criminality depend entirely on the sub-
jective effect of the light upon the complainant.
The judgment was reversed in County Court,78 on the grounds that the
rules of criminal law are applicable to statutes which create traffic infractions,70
and as such this statute was vague and failed to give the required warning to
citizens as to what constitutes a violation of the law.80 The clarity of the
offense described by a criminal statute raises a constitutional question since
it is one of the requirements of the due process guarantee.81
Upon petition of the Attorney General in his statutory capacity,8 2 the
case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court answered defendant's first contention by stating that vagueness
only resulted when the phrase "dazzling light" was isolated from the overall
context of the statute. The proscribed conduct of the accused is the operation
of multiple beam headlamps so as to produce dazzling light. Read in its en-
tirety this can have but one meaning which the average citizen would so under-
75. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
76. Christal v. Police Comm. of San Francisco, supra note 72.
77. 7 N.Y.2d 391, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1960).
78. 19 Misc. 2d 837, 194 N.Y.S.2d 823 (County Ct. 1959).
79. People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
80. People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d 472, 168 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1957).
81. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
82. N.Y. Executive Law § 71.
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stand, and that is the operation of the headlights on the brightest of the
alternative beams. This interpretation was plainly the meaning intended by
the Legislature as evidenced by the legislative note accompanying the 1959
amendment to the statute.83
As to the second contention, defendant relied on People v. GroganN4 for
the proposition that the word "interferes" is too indefinite to be constitutional.
In that case there was a statute which prohibited unnecessary interference with
the free and proper use of the public highway. The Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of that statute by equating unnecessary with unreasonable, and said
that the word thus qualified gave a meaningful and objective measure of
comfort. Defendant argues that since here we have no such qualification the
term is constitutionally indefinite.
This Court holds that case to be no authority for defendant's proposition,
for there the crime itself was described as unnecessary interference, with no
other objective standard of determining what the interference was. Here, the
interference is the operation of the headlamps so as to produce dazzling light.
The objective standard of measurement is the probable effect of said light
on a reasonable man and this is sufficiently definite to warn the citizen. The
Court cites People v. Harvey85 where it was held that the interference pro-
hibited by the statute in that case was a definable standard of conduct. It is
not the possible subjective effect on a hypersensitive individual, but "un-
reasonable interference with the reasonable man."
By a unanimous decision, the case was reversed on the law and remanded
to the lower court for redetermination on the issues of fact.
MAGISTRATES' COTRT GIvEN PoWER TO TRy MISDEMEANORS
In People v. Peck86 the constitutionality of the Defense Emergency Act s7
was before the Court of Appeals for the first time. -
Defendants were a group of avowed pacifists, who congregated in City
Hall Park, in New York City during an air raid, refusing to take shelter. They
were arrested, and a Magistrates' Court of the City of New York,88 assuming
jurisdiction under Section 102 of the Defense Emergency Act,8 9 convicted
83. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 15(3) as amended by N.Y. Laws of 1959, ch. 582.
84. 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273 (1932).
85. 307 N.Y. 588, 123 N.E.2d 81 (1954).
86. 7 N.Y.2d 76, 195 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1959).
87. N.Y. Defense Emergency Act § 101(2):
Any person who shall wilfully violate or disobey any duly promulgated regula-
tion or order, or who shall wilfully violate or disobey any official order by a
person duly authorized concerning.... (b) the conduct of civilians and the move-
ment and cessation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic shall be guilty of *a mis-
demeanor.
88. People v. Parilli, 1 Misc. 2d 201, 147 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Magist. Ct. 1955).
89. N.Y. Defense Emergency Act § 102:
Courts of Special Session outside the city of New York and city magistrates
courts in the city of New York, in the first instance, shall have exclusive juris-
diction to hear and determine charges of violations constituting misdemeanors
or infractions under this act or under any rule, regulation or order duly promul-
103
